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COMPENSATION FOR POSSIBILITIES OF REVERTER AND
POWERS OF TERMINATION UNDER
CONDEMNATION LAW
Condemnation of land has increased greatly in recent years, resulting in a reevaluation of traditional ideas and their applicability to
modern circumstances. The purpose of this note is to contrast the
traditional handling of possibilities of reverter and powers of termination in eminent domain proceedings with the more recent handling
of these interests, and to set forth the position that California has
taken with respect to them.
Possibilities of reverter and powers of termination are lumped
together in this note, and by the courts,1 for they pose the same valuation problems in condemnation. The primary valuation difficulty is
that, although both are considered to be contingent interests, 2 neither
is subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. 3 They may, therefore,
continue as contingent interests forever. The differences between
these two interests do become significant, however, once the limiting
event or condition subsequent has occurred. For example, the possibility of reverter immediately becomes a possessory estate regardless
of the owner's intention, while the power of termination does not become possessory until the owner manifests his election that the
granted estate is forfeited.4 These mergers of interests, however,
present little difficulty, as the handling of the award in these cases is
largely uncontrovertible. 5
1 Browder, The Condemnation of Future Interests, 48 VA. L. REv. 461,
472 (1962) (citing cases); see, e.g., Puerto Rico v. United States, 132 F.2d 220,
221 (1st Cir. 1942); People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Fresno, 210

Cal. App. 2d 500, 504, 26 Cal. Rptr. 853, 855 (1962); Santa Monica v. Jones,
104 Cal. App. 2d 463, 467-68, 232 P.2d 55, 58 (1951); 1 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY

§ 53 (1936).

See Johnson v. Los Angeles, 176 Cal. 479, 486, 168 P. 1047, 1049 (1917);
Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 35, 187 P. 159, 162 (1919); L. SnMrs, HANMBOOK or = LAW OF FumuRE INTERESTS 29 (2d ed. 1966).
s L. Snvms, supra note 2, at 118.
4 See People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Fresno, 210 Cal. App.
2d 500, 504-05, 26 Cal. Rptr. 853, 855-56 (1962) (general discussion of these
differences).
2

5 Where the limiting event has -occurred it is obvious that the holder of

the possibility of reverter is entitled to the entire award as he is then the
holder of the entire fee. In the case of a power of termination, however, the

holder of the non-possessory estate must take certain steps to effect a forfeiture. If he fails to take such steps within a reasonable time, he will be
found to have waived his right of re-entry. See Browder, supra note 1, at 474.
[787]
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Majority Position
For the most part the courts have refused to allow possibilities of
reverter and powers of termination to share in any condemnation
award. 6 In doing so the courts have generally relied on one or more
of three grounds: 1) the interest that the owner has in a possibility of reverter or power of termination is too remote and speculative; 2) the owner's interest is taken at the same time as the possessory estate and, therefore, there is no disuser during the existence of
the future interest that would result in the forfeiture of the possessory estate; 3) the performance of the condition is excused by operation of law.
The most common ground for denying recovery is that possibilities of reverter and powers of termination are too speculative, remote,
or contingent to be subjected to valuation. 7 The leading authority is
a New York case, First Reformed Dutch Church v. Croswell,8 which
held that any rights inherent in these interests were mere possibilities and "possessed no value capable of estimate."' ) Similarly, a New
Hampshire court 10 found that there was "no method by which the
value of the interest could be assessed which would rise above the
dignity of a guess"" so that it was a "matter too indefinite and vague
for pecuniary estimation.' 2 A Massachusetts court 13 reached the
same conclusion, stating that such interests were "too remote and contingent to be the subject of an estimate of damages."'14 The federal
courts have also generally denied participation in condemnation
awards to the owners of possibilities of reverter and powers of termination. 15 For example, in Puerto Rico v. United States16 it was held
that these interests were only speculative and that "it is elementary
'17
law that damages cannot be assessed by mere guesswork.'
6 Browder, supra note 1, at 472.
7 E.g., Beard's Erie Basin, Inc. v. New York, 142 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1944); Puerto Rico v.. United States, 132 F.2d 220, 222 (1st Cir. 1942); United
States v. 16 Acres of Land, 47 F. Supp. 603, 604 (D.Mass. 1942); Romero v.
Department of Pub. Works, 17 Cal. 2d 189, 194-95, 109 P.2d 662, 665 (1941);
People ex rel Department of Pub. Works v. Fresno, 210 Cal. App. 2d 500, 515,
26 Cal. Rptr. 853, 862 (1962); People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Los
Angeles, 179 Cal. App. 2d 558, 574, 4 Cal. Rptr. 531, 542 (1960); Chandler v.
Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 125 Mass. 544, 547 (1878); Lyford v. Laconia,
75 N.H. 220, 226, 72 A. 1085, 1089 (1909). See generally 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EmINENT DOMAI
§ 119, at 516 (2d ed. 1953).
8

210 App. Div. 294, 206 N.Y.S. 132 (1924).
N.Y.S. at 134.

9 Id. at 295, 206

10 Lyford v. Laconia, 75 N.H. 220, 72 A. 1085 (1909).
11 Id. at 226, 72 A. at 1089.
12 Id. at 228, 72 A. at 1090.
'3

14

Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 125 Mass. 544 (1878).
Id. at 547.

15 E.g., Beard's Erie Basin, Inc. v. New York, 142 F.2d 487, 489 (2nd Cir.
1944).
16 132 F.2d 220 (1st Cir. 1942).
17 Id. at 222.
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The second ground, that there is no reversion or breach of the
condition during the existence of the future interest, 8 also had its
beginnings in the Croswell decision.19 That court had reasoned that
the seizure was of the entire title at the same instant and that there
was, therefore, no interval of time during which a reverter could occur. When the church ceased the specified use, the possibility of reverter was no longer in existence. Thus, "[a]t the moment of appropriation there had been no disuser.120 In United States v. 2.02
relied on Croswell in adopting
Acres of Land,21 the court specifically
22
this ground for denying recovery.
The third ground for denying recovery is that the condition is
excused by operation of law.23 The courts hold that the owner of the
possessory estate has not voluntarily ceased the required use of the
land, but has been compelled to do so by the condemning authority.
Compliance with the condition is therefore excused and no forfeiture
results: "[I] t is uniformly held that realty does not revert where
the use specified in the deed is discontinued solely because of a taking
under the power of eminent domain. '24 The courts generally first
determine that the interest has not become possessory on either of the
last two grounds, then hold that the interest has no value in and of itself, being too speculative and remote. Under this approach, the
25
owner of the interest is entitled to no more than nominal damages.
Critique
It is apparent that the courts that have adopted the general rule
of denying compensation to the holder of the possibility of reverter or
the power of termination, regard interests in land as having no value
apart from actual possession of the land. They simply disregard "any
interest the likelihood of whose eventuality cannot be gauged. '26 By
so disregarding these interests they have, of course, avoided the real
problem-the valuation of these interests. One court, 27 in examining
See, e.g., id. at 221-22.
19 First Reformed Dutch Church v. Croswell, 210 App. Div. 294, 295, 206
N.Y.S. 132, 133-34 (1924).
20 Id., 206 N.Y.S. at 134.
21 51 F. Supp. 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd sub noam., Westchester County
Park Comm'n v. United States, 143 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1944).
22 Id. at 61.
28 See, e.g., People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Los Angeles,
179 Cal. App. 2d 558, 4 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1960); Santa Monica v. Jones, 104 Cal.
App. 2d 463, 232 P.2d 55 (1951); Lyford v. Laconia, 75 N.H. 220, 72 A. 1085
18

(1909); First Reformed Dutch Church v. Croswell, 210 App. Div. 294, 206

N.Y.S. 132 (1924).

Contra, Lancaster School Dist. v. Lancaster County, 295

Pa. 112, 144 A. 901 (1929).

24 State v. Independent School Dist. No. 31, 266 Minn. 85, 91, 123 N.W.2d
121, 126 (1963) (citing cases).
25 Cases cited note 23 supra.
20 L. ORGEL, supra note 7, at 516.
27 Midwestern Developments, Inc. v. Tulsa, 374 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1967).
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the reasoning of a prior decision that it had cited favorably, simply
stated that "such interests were not possessory and too uncertain to
compensation, therefore, not property in the constitutional
admit of
28
sense."
But the issue may not be so easily avoided, since "the preferred
view today is that all varieties of future interests are existing interests."2 9 Possibilities of reverter and powers of termination are
contingent interests in land3" and contingent interests have "achieved
status as a protectable interest for many purposes." 31 Most states
have provided that possibilities of reverter are freely alienable3 2 and
3
powers of termination are becoming so in more and more states.
Should not these interests be entitled to a just compensation when
taken by condemnation?
The fact that they cannot be given an exact value should not be a
deterrent to valuation. The Supreme Court 34 has stated that at times
the determination of a just compensation "involves, at best, a guess
by informed persons" 35 and that "[w]here, for any reason, property
has no market [value], resort must be had to other data to ascertain
its value; and, even in the ordinary case, assessment of market value
involves the use of assumptions, which make it unlikely that the appraisal will reflect true value with nicety."3' 6
Possibilities of reverter and powers of termination are "property
interests possessing at times considerable value ' 37 apart from the
possibility that they may become possessory. The grantor may convey the land for the purpose of attracting certain business or institutions into an area where he has other holdings. For example, a property owner that desires a railroad to locate near his property might
convey a portion of his land for a nominal sum on the condition that a
railroad be constructed on such land. 38 By reserving in himself and
28 Id. at 687.
29 1 AMERiCAN

LAW OF PROPERTY

§ 4.1, at 407 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952)

(emphasis added).
30 Cases cited note 2 supra.
31 1

L. SnwEs & A. SmITE

THE LAw OF FUTURE INTEREsTs

§ 136, at 117

(2d ed. 1956).

1 AmEmcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.70, at 530 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 281 (1967); see 2 RESTATEENT OF
PROPERTY § 159 (1936).
38 2 R. POWELL, supra note 32, at § 282; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 699,
32

R. POWELL, THE
1046.
34

United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1942).

34 Id.at 375.

86 Id.at 374.
37 Comment, The Effect of Condemnation Proceedings Upon Possibilities
of Reverter and Powers of Termination, 38 U. DET. L.J. 46 (1960).
8 See, e.g., Romero v. Department of Pub. Works, 17 Cal. 2d 189, 191, 109
P.2d 662, 663 (1941) ("one dollar and the benefits to be derived from the
construction and operation of [the] railroad .... "); Santa Monica v. Jones,
104 Cal. App. 2d 463, 232 P.2d 55 (1951).
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his heirs a possibility of reverter or a power of termination, the
grantor seeks to ensure that the railroad will locate there and that if
they do not, he will have his land back. Such an interest is a valuable
asset to the grantor. Similar situations arise where land is conveyed to
a church or hospital and the grantor desires to be sure that the land
will be used exclusively for such purposes. 9 It is also common for a
grantor to seek to ensure that certain undesirable businesses, such as
taverns or factories, will not locate there.40 In all such cases the
grantor has specifically refrained from conveying all that he has and,
in most cases, what he has conveyed is less valuable than it would be
with no restrictions placed on its use. To give the entire condemnation award to the grantee, which is based on the value of the land for
the best possible use, would be to pay him for rights that in fact he
never had.
One final problem with the general rule is that it can be used to
defeat the interest of the grantor or his heirs. In one instance 41 a
school seeking to acquire an athletic field had initially desired to purchase the land, but resorted to eminent domain on learning that a condition in the deed precluded any sale. 42 The school thereby defeated
the interest of the grantor and his heirs, leaving them with nothing to
show for the interest they once had held. The owner of the determinable fee, however, who had paid only a nominal consideration for the
property, found himself substantially enriched. This is certainly not
just compensation. A minority of courts, recognizing these inequities,
have arrived at methods of valuating and protecting these interests.

Minority Positions
The Mississippi court, in Hemphill v. State Highway Commission,48 after inquiring into the nature of future interests in general,
concluded that the mere fact that an estate is not vested does not
mean that it is not protected under federal law.44 The court then
"decline[d] to follow the majority rule which denies compensation
39 See, e.g., Lutes v. Louisville & N.R.R., 158 Ky. 259, 164 S.W. 792 (1914)
(church); United Baptist Convention v. East Weare Baptist Church, 103 N.H.
521, 176 A.2d 325 (1961) (church); State v. Federal Square Corp., 89 N.H. 538,
3 A.2d 109 (1938) (library); In re Cook's Will, 243 App. Div. 706, 277 N.Y.S.
26 (1935) (hospital); First Reformed Dutch Church v. Croswell, 210 App.
Div. 294, 206 N.Y.S. 132 (1924) (church); Banner Baptist Church v. Watson,
193 Tenn. 290, 246 S.W.2d 17 (1951) (church).
40 By limiting the use to which the land may be put, the grantor can prevent undesirable elements from acquiring or locating on the land. For example, a conveyance for residential purposes only would achieve this purpose.
41 State v. Independent School Dist. No. 31, 266 Minn. 85, 123 N.W.2d
121 (1963).

Id. at 90, 123 N.W.2d at 125.
245 Miss. 33, 145 So. 2d 455 (1962).
Id. at 48, 145 So. 2d at 462, citing 1 L. Snmus & A. Smrm, supra note
31, at § 136.
42

48
44
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to owners of all future interests taken by the state. There is no rational basis for such a general doctrine. It is not equitable, and it is
not consistent with other legal principles related to such existing estates in land . . . . 45 In support of valuation the court pointed out
that one "who possesses an interest which he can sell has an interest
for which he ought to be paid upon taking or condemnation by the
state."46
The harshness of the general rule was apparent to the American
Law Institute as well. Section 53(c) of the Restatement of Property
provides that the holder of the possibility of reverter or power of
termination is entitled to participate in the award when it is found
that the happening of the condition or limiting event is "imminent."
However, no guidelines were provided as to what was to be considered imminent. The Institute in recognizing this noted that "[n] o
more definite rules for the division of the award between the owner
of the estate in fee simple defeasible and the owner of the future interest have been established either by decision or by statute." 47 The
Institute left this for the courts and legislatures to work out for themselves. The result has been that while the section has been widely
recognized by the courts,48 the necessary imminence that would justify participation in the award has been found in only a few instances.4 9 Courts have shown such reluctance to find this requisite
imminence ° that one court was led to conclude "that the owner of
the future interest is not adequately protected by [the Restatement]
rule. ....51
Recently, some courts have found a more effective means of protecting these interests. The basic principle behind these latter decisions is that "in a condemnation situation, the parties are not contending over an indivisible parcel of real estate but rather over a
sum of money which can be divided between the parties if necessary
45 Hemphill v. State H'way Comm'n, 245 Miss. 33, 51, 145 So. 2d 455,
463 (1962).
46 Id.
47 1 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 53 (c) (1936).
48 E.g., United States v. 1,111.15 Acres of Land, 44 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. IlL
1942); People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Fresno, 210 Cal. App. 2d
500, 517, 26 Cal. Rptr. 853, 863 (1962); Santa Monica v. Jones, 104 Cal. App.
2d 463, 474-75, 232 P.2d 55, 62-63 (1951); see People ex rel. Department of
Pub. Works v. Los Angeles, 179 Cal. App. 2d 558, 574, 4 Cal. Rptr. 531, 541-42

(1960) (applying rule but not mentioning Restatement by name).

40 See, e.g., United States v. 2,184 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 681 (W.D.
Ark. 1942); Chew v. Comiiionwealth, 400 Pa. 307, 161 A.2d 621 (1960).
50 See, e.g., Santa Monica v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 2d 463, 232 P.2d 55
(1951), in which the court determined that the various breaches of conditions
subsequent were not sufficient to give rise to the exercise of the power of
termination.
51 State v. Independent School Dist. No. 31, 266 Minn. 85, 95, 123 N.W.2d
121, 129 (1963).
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in the interest of substantial justice. '52 The results of these decisions
may be divided into three basic categories: (1) the entire award
goes to the holder of the defeasible fee who holds it on the same condition as that on which he held the land; (2) a lump sum award is
divided between the parties; or (3) a combination of these two.
The first category has resulted chiefly where the grantor has conveyed the land on a condition that it be used for some charitable
purpose. 53 In re Cook's Will,54 a New York decision, held that where
land had been conveyed to a hospital on the condition that it be used
only for the hospital, the proceeds of the condemnation award were to
be deposited in a separate fund. The hospital was entitled to the income from this fund on the condition that it be used only for hospital
purposes. This result is subject to the criticism that the hospital,
which had a defeasible fee in the property taken, got no more than is
the customary condemnation award for a life estate under similar
circumstances. 55 However, the limitation in this case is analogous to
a life estate, for if the land were no longer used for hospital purposes
the hospital would necessarily cease to exist.
In a later New Hampshire decision, 0 land was conveyed on the
condition that it be used solely for Baptist worship. Upon condemnation of the land, the court established a constructive trust in the
amount of the award, under which the church could utilize all the
funds, so long as they were used for Baptists purposes. This result
seems more equitable than that of the Cook decision, as it preserves
the intent of the grantor as nearly as possible and also provides some
57
measure of assurance that this intent will be carried out.
The second category of cases has resulted in a division of the
lump sum award between the parties. In State v. Independent School
District No. 31,58 the Minnesota court adopted this method, recognizing that possibilities of reverter and powers of termination were not
adequately protected by the Restatement rule,59 and held that in "some
situations the possibility of reverter may have more than nominal
52
53
54

r5
1966).
of full
56

Comment, supra note 37, at 54.
Cases cited note 39 supra.
243 App. Div. 706, 277 N.Y.S. 26 (1935).
See L. SimEs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTEREsTs 116 (2d ed.
It is arguable that mere "income for his life might be said to fall short
compensation for a fee simple." Id.
United Baptist Convention v. East Weare Baptist Church, 103 N.H.

521, 176 A.2d 325 (1961).
57 The results in these cases may be explained by the particular circumstances which would allow an application of the cy-pres doctrine, but
this would not prevent a similar handling of non-charitable limitations or
conditions.
58

266 Minn. 85, 123 N.W.2d 121 (1963).

59 Id. at 95, 123 N.W.2d at 129. This particular case has been cited in a
later federal decision as an example of special circumstances that would allow
the holder of such a future interest to participate in the award. See Midwestern Developments, Inc. v. Tulsa, 374 F.2d 683, 688 (10th Cir. 1967).
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value." 60 This division of the lump sum award is based on the fact
that valuation in condemnation is predicated on market value and
that often limitations upon the use of property prevent its being used
in the most beneficial way.0 ' The court found that since the restricted
use is not taken into account in determining the amount of the award,
which is based on the value of the land for its best possible use, an inequity often results. 62 Consequently, the owner of the defeasible fee
should be entitled only to that proportion of the award that the value
of his restricted interest bears to the unrestricted value, with the
balance going to the holder of the possibility of reverter. Where the
restricted use has a value equal to or greater than the reasonable
market value, the holder of the future interest is only entitled to a
nominal award.6 3 It is worth noting that the court felt inclined to
take this approach even though no attempt was made by the owner
of the possibility of reverter to establish the value of his interest. 4
The third method of handling possibilities of reverter and powers
of termination by the minority courts is that adopted by the Ohio
court in Ink v. Canton.6 5 It is a synthesis of the first two methods.
In that case, the land under condemnation had been conveyed to the
city on the condition that it be used as a public park.66 The court
stated that where the grantee has paid full market value for the
property, compensation to the grantor should be denied since any
award paid to him would amount to a windfall. 67 But where the
grantee paid little or nothing for the fee, the amount by which the
value of the unrestricted fee exceeds the value of the restricted fee
should be paid to the grantor. Since the grantor in Canton expressly
refrained from conveying the whole estate to the grantee, and received nothing for what he did convey, the court concluded that at the
time of appropriation by the state the grantor was entitled to the difference in the value of the property as measured with and without
restrictions.68 In such a situation, the court held the right not too
remote or contingent for purposes of valuation. 69
The court next considered the argument that the whole award
should go to the grantee because the grantor's condition, imposed
only to compel the grantee to make a specified use of the property,
70
had been excused by the condemnation and was no longer effective.
60

State v. Independent School Dist. No. 31, 266 MVinn. 85, 96, 123 N.W.2d

121, 129 (1963).

61 See id. (citing cases and other authorities).
62 See id. at 96-97, 123 N.W.2d at 129.
63 Id. at 97, 123 N.W.2d at 129-30.
64 Id. at 92, 123 N.W.2d at 126.
65 4 Ohio St. 2d 51, 212 N.E.2d 574 (1965).
66 Id. at 52, 212 N.E.2d at 575.
67 Id. at 55, 212 N.E.2d at 577.
68 Id.

69 See id.
70 See id. at 55-56, 212 N.E.2d at 577.
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The court found that, regardless of this argument, it "does not represent a reason for giving the grantee the value of something he has
not lost (i.e., the amount, if any, by which the value of the property
taken exceeds its lesser value for the restricted use that the grantee
could have made of it) where the grantor expressly refrained from
conveying that something to him."71 The court then pointed out that
in the usual situation involving possibilities of reverter or powers of
termination there is only land to be awarded, while in the case of
money, which can and should be
eminent domain there is an award of
72
divided where the situation dictates.
The court further provided that since the city had undertaken a
fiduciary responsibility by accepting the conveyance, any money that
the city received should be held in trust subject to the same conditions
under which the property was held, and any money not used for Ink
Park purposes should revert to the grantor. 73 This solution was possible because only a portion of the park was taken by the condemning
authority, and it was not an undue burden to require that the award
be used in conjunction with the remaining portion of the park. In this
way the court prevented the city from being unjustly enriched, while
also assuring that the award given would be used for the purposes
specified in the original conveyance and not for other purposes.
There are two more minority approaches that should be mentioned. First, some courts have directly controverted the majority
74
position, holding that the grantor alone is entitled to the award.
The rationale for such a position has been that the taking by the government amounts to a breach of the conditions imposed by the grantor,
and the land, therefore, reverts to the grantor. However, in at
least one instance 75 where the court awarded the entire judgment to
the grantor, it did so only to give effect to the particular intent of the
grantor, which by the terms of his deed indicated that a taking by
eminent domain would in fact operate as a breach of the condition
76
The position of other
regardless of the city's power to prevent it.
As
cases giving the grantor the entire award cannot be so justified.
77
such, their position is untenable and almost universally rejected.
A second possible approach would be to use the Internal Revenue
Service method of valuating future interests for Federal Gift Tax
Id. at 56, 212 N.E.2d at 577-78.
Id. at 56-57, 212 N.E.2d at 578, citing 1 L. SnIES & A. SmTH, THE LAW
INTERESTS § 2013 (1966); Comment, The Effect of Condemnation
OF FuTuRu
Proceedings Upon Possibilities of Reverter and Powers of Termination, 38 U.
DET. L.J. 46, 54 (1960).
71
72

73

Ink v. Canton, 4 Ohio St. 2d 51, 58, 212 N.E.2d 574, 579 (1965).

E.g., Pedrotti v. Marin County, 152 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1946); Crowl v.
Tidnam, 198 Okla. 650, 181 P.2d 549 (1947); Lancaster School Dist. v. Lancaster County, 295 Pa. 112, 144 A. 901 (1929).
75 Pedrotti v. Matin County, 152 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1946).
76 See id. at 831.
77 See cases cited note 24 and text accompanying note 24 supra.
74
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purposes by the use of actuarial tables.78 While this solution necessarily would be limited to situations where the particular contingency
is dependent on the life of a particular person, or the outliving of one
person by another, it remains, nevertheless, as a possibility.

California Position
California requires that each separate estate or interest in land
shall be valued individually in condemnation proceedings. 9 Possibilities of reverter and powers of termination should fall within
this provision since the courts hold that they are interests in property. 0 However, the Supreme Court of California, in its only decision directly in point, has adopted the majority position denying
compensation for reversionary interests. Romero v. Department of
Public Works"- dealt with the condemnation of a narrow strip of land
held by a railroad under a deed that was given on the consideration of
one dollar plus "benefits to be derived by [the grantor] from the
construction and operation of a railroad ....,,82 The deed provided
that the land was to be used only for railroad purposes and that if
such use ceased, the land was to revert to the grantor.8 3 The court
found that the performance of the condition was made impossible by
operation of law, and that since the limiting event had not occurred
prior to condemnation, the future interest was too speculative and
remote to have any compensable value.84 The court did recognize
that possibilities of reverter and powers of termination should have a
separate valuation, but only where the land taken has some special
value to the owner apart from the use of the land, such as the value of
mineral rights.8 5 The effect was to award the railroad the value of the
land for its best possible use even though the lesser value for the
restricted use was acquired for only a nominal sum.
In more recent California cases the rule set forth in the Restatement of Property has been recognized, yet no court has found such
imminence of the terminating event that would allow the holder of
the possibility of reverter or power of termination to share in the
See Treas. Reg. 25.2512-5 (d). See also 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
§ 666, at 112-21 (1967).
79 "The court, jury, or referee must hear such legal testimony as may be
offered by any of the parties to the proceeding, and thereupon must ascertain and assess: 1. Value. The value of the property sought to be condemned, and all improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each
78

PROPERTY

and every separate estate or interest therein." CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1248(1).
80 Johnston v. Los Angeles, 176 Cal. 479, 168 P. 1047 (1917); Strong v.

Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 187 P. 159 (1919); see 29 CAL.
81 17 Cal. 2d 189, 109 P.2d 662 (1941).
82 Id. at 191, 109 P.2d at 663.
83 Id. at 191, 109 P.2d at 664.
84 Id. at 194, 109 P.2d at 665.
85 Id. at 195, 109 P.2d at 665,

L. REV. 525, 526 (1941).
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award. 6 In Santa Monica v. Jones87 the court determined that the
land had been conveyed to the railroad on a condition subsequent as
in the Romero case. The deed stipulated that if the land was not used
for railway purposes, or the railway should cease to run a daily passenger service, or any structures not necessary to the operation of
the railroad were constructed thereon, the land would revert to the
grantor.8 8 Relying directly on Croswell the court held that the taking
by the government did not amount to a breach of the condition, and
even if it were a breach, the heirs had not elected to declare a forfeiture of the possessory estate. 89 The court found that forfeiture
was not imminent even though the railroad had made application on
several occasions to discontinue passenger service.90
In finding no imminence the court cited a New York case, Carter
91
v. New York Central Railroad,
as authority. However, while the
question of immimence was raised in the New York case, the actual
decision was based on a determination that the possibility of reverter
had no "value capable of estimate. ' 92 Moreover, the California court
even went so far as to say that a breach of the condition subsequent
prior to condemnation would not entitle the heirs of the grantor to
participate in the award.93 The court did not go into the question of
a special value apart from the use of the land, which was raised in
Romero, but simply stated that no such value was alleged. 94 This
result was reached despite the fact that California requires a separate
valuation of all interests in the land.9 5
In People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Los Angeles,9 6
land had been conveyed to the City of Los Angeles for the purposes
of a public park. The land was deeded on the condition that it be
used exclusively for a public park to be known as Griffith Park.
The state subsequently condemned part of the land for the construc86 See People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Fresno, 210 Cal. App.
2d 500, 517, 26 Cal. Rptr. 853, 863 (1962); People ex rel. Department of Pub.

Works v. Los Angeles, 179 Cal. App. 2d 558, 574, 4 Cal. Rptr. 531, 541-42
(1960); Santa Monica v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 2d 463, 474-75, 232 P.2d 55,
62-63 (1951).
87 104 Cal. App. 2d 463, 232 P.2d 55 (1951).
88 Id. at 468, 232 P.2d at 58-59.
89 Id. at 472-73, 232 P.2d at 61.
90 Id. at 471, 232 P.2d at 60.
03 73 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
92 Id. at 614.
93

(1951).

Santa Monica v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 2d 463, 473, 232 P.2d 55, 61
This holding caused one writer to comment that such reasoning rep-

resented blind adherance to the rule of Croswell.

Comment, The Effect of

Condemnation Proceedings Upon Possibilities of Reverter and Powers of
Termination, 38 U. DET. L.J. 46, 50 (1960).
94 See Santa Monica v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 2d 463, 474, 232 P.2d 55, 62
(1951).
95 CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 1248 (1).
96 179 Cal. App. 2d 558, 4 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1960).
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tion of the Golden State Freeway. The court first determined that
the land was held on a condition subsequent 97 and that there was no
breach of the condition prior to condemnation.98 The court then concluded that any interest that the heirs had in the land was "so remote,
speculative and contingent as to justify no consideration by the
court .... ,99 As in Santa Monica v. Jones, no evidence was pre-

sented by the claimant as to the value of his right 0 0
The most recent California case is People ex rel. Department of
Public Works v. Fresno'0 1 in which a large parcel of property was
conveyed to the City of Fresno for municipal purposes, including use
as a municipal airport, and "for no other purpose."'1 2 The heirs of
the grantor were named as co-defendants in the condemnation proceeding, along with the city. The trial court had determined that the
city's interest in the property had terminated, and awarded the entire amount of compensation to the heirs of the grantor. 03 In overruling the trial court, the appellate court assumed for the purposes of
adjudication that the conveyance created a determinable fee, 04 and
found that there had been no reversion prior to the taking. Further,
since the cessation of the required use was involuntary, the taking itself did not cause a reversion. 0 5 The court further found that there
was no evidence of imminent reversion at the time of condemnation. 0 6
The court held that the non-compensability rule for "speculative" contingent interests, as developed in prior California cases dealing with
conditions subsequent, applied with equal force to the reversionary interest incident to a determinable fee. 0 7 However, the court did at
least recognize those cases that imposed the grantor's conditions upon
the award, and indicated that such a provision under the facts of
Fresno would be proper. 0 8 Concededly, the city itself had volunteered this stipulation, but the willingness of the court to implement such a provision under the right circumstances may be an indication that some measure of protection will be afforded these interests in California condemnation proceedings.

Conclusion
In the words of a Mississippi court, "there are other soundly rea97 Id. at 570, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 539.

98 Id. at 575, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
99 Id. at 574, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
100 Id. at 575, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
101 210 Cal. App. 2d 500, 26 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1962).
102 Id. at 503, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
103 Id. at 504, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
104 Id.

105 Id. at 509, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
100 Id. at 517, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
107

Id. at 515, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 862.

108 Id. at 518, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 863 (citing favorably cases noted in sec-

tion on minority position).
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soned cases, in a minority, holding that a future interest in land which
is not tenuous and which is capable of evaluation is a compensable
right when taken or damaged by the state for public use."'0 9 Such
a result would appear to be dictated in states such as California where
future interests are classified as property, and all property interests
are required to have a separate valuation in condemnation proceedings.
The recent trend has been in favor of protecting these interests.
California apparently recognizes this trend -as favorable, as evidenced
by its general recognition of the Restatement rule and the language of
Fresno indicating approval of the imposition of the grantor's conditions upon the grantee's award. It is also important to note that
there have been no major California decisions on this point subsequent
to the decisions by the Minnesota and Ohio courts, which made the
first major breakthroughs in this area.
It is suggested that these interests do have a value in and of
themselves, apart from any likelihood of their becoming possessory.
Concededly, the condemnation of land by a public authority does not
effect a reversion to the grantor or his heirs, or a breach of the condition subsequent. But the mere fact that the interests have not become possessory is no reason to deny their participation in the award.
Unfortunately, in so denying participation, the courts have limited
themselves by implication to the idea that value lies only in possession of the land or in the possibility thereof. It should be recognized
that in certain instances these interests do have independent value,
and it is necessary to formulate means of estimating and protecting
them.
Roger A. Grable*
109 Hemphill v. State H'way Comm'n, 245 Miss. 33, 50, 145 So. 2d 455,
463 (1962) (citing cases).
* Member, Second Year Class

